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As Member States struggle to retain the investment grades necessary to allow them to finance their 
governmental operations at a reasonable cost, credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been blamed for 
exacerbating a procyclical bias which only makes this task more difficult. How CRAs contribute to 
the constitution of the politics of limits underpinning the European sovereign debt crisis is at the core 
of this article. As a socio-technical device of control, sovereign ratings are an ‘illocutionary’ 
statement about budgetary health, which promotes an artificial fiscal normality. Subsequently, these 
austere politics of creditworthiness have ‘perlocutionary’ effects, which seek to censure political 
discretion through normalizing risk techniques aligned with the self-systemic, and thereby self-
regulating, logic of Anglo-American versions of capitalism. The ensuing antagonistic relationship 
between the programmatic/expertise and operational/politics dimensions of fiscal governance leaves 
Europe vulnerable to crisis and the renegotiation of how the ‘political’ is established in the economy. 
New regulatory technical standards (RTS) can exacerbated the performative effects on CRAs, 
investors and Member States. 
 
Keywords: credit rating agencies; European Union; risk and uncertainty; sovereign debt crisis; 
financial governance; performativity 
 
Introduction  
Already implicated in numerous financial scandals, ranging from the 1998 Asian crisis to the 2003 
fraudulent Parmalat debacle to the recent 2007-08 credit crisis, credit rating agencies (CRAs) once 
again have found themselves in the eye of the financial storm (Gamble, 2009; Mügge, 2011; 
Partnoy, 2006; Sinclair, 2010). With escalating contagion threatening the very integrity of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) itself, and the global economic recovery, what actually constitutes as 
the ‘real’ risk of sovereign debt default has become the focus of much scrutiny. Plagued by the 
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persistent threat of or actual credit rating downgrade by one of the three main agencies – Moody’s 
Investor Services (Moody’s), Standard and Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings – the European Union 
(EU) is taking determined steps to regulate these financial intermediaries blamed for providing much 
of the firepower for the onslaught. Speculation in the bond markets – often triggered by the coercive 
tactics of CRAs (Kerwer, 2005: 461) – only escalates the attacks against Member States; thereby 
further undermining EU efforts in containing the sovereign debt crisis. As panic spreads, and short 
positions prove profitable, the construction of these ratings is seldom problematized; or until it is too 
late. Thus, it is compelling to concede that these (rash or late) rating actions simply signal the further 
authoritative ascendance of this unelected cabal of private agencies and the continued descendence 
of democratic governments. Of course, this tension is not restricted to Europe alone, as democratic 
governments around the world must grapple with this problem. Not even the United States is 
immune from such ‘epistocracy’ – knowledge-based rule (Estlund, 2008); as its 5 August 2011 
downgrade from ‘AAA’ to ‘AA+’ by S&P demonstrates. Although the modulating effect of ratings 
varies according to the political economy, no state is immune.  
This ‘battle’ between the EU and CRAs is the most recent occasion for the more pressing 
puzzle which is ultimately about the ‘politics of limits’ – the construction of the parameters defining 
the budgetary realities facing governments. Democratic sovereign states struggle with private 
markets in the constitution of authoritative knowledge underpinning creditworthiness, and thus 
access to the vital debt financing which helps facilitate their programs of national self-determination, 
such as fiscal stimulus. Insofar as sovereign bond ratings exercise a certain degree of influence over 
the constitution of creditworthiness to help construct an austere fiscal ‘normality’, what does this 
politics of limits mean for EU efforts to manage the debt crisis and instill greater stability in the 
eurozone? Furthermore, how does the EU regulatory response compromise these attempts? At the 
core of this article is how we understand the act of (sovereign) rating and its institutional agency 
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(CRAs) within the context of (European) sovereign debt crisis and the ability of governments to 
establish the parameters of the political within the economy. 
To come to terms with this puzzle, this article problematizes the act of rating sovereign debt 
to reveal how its authoritative capacity, in large part, stems from how convincingly ratings normalize 
a fictitious bifurcation between the ‘economy’ and ‘politics’ in the constitution of what counts as 
authoritative knowledge in the market. Political discretion becomes increasingly marginalized and 
censured as normalizing mathematical/risk models depoliticize the decision-making process (de 
Goede, 2005; Langley, 2008; Luhmann, 1993). Rather than simply ‘informed opinions’, it is through 
their ‘performative’ effects (Austin, 1962; Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2004), as a socio-technical 
device of ‘control’ (Deleuze, 1995), that ratings construct an infrastructure of referentiality – via the 
‘AAA’ scale – denoting what ‘correct’ and ‘normal’ fiscal conduct should entail. Investment-grades 
grant access to liquid capital markets so governments must adapt to satisfy their (austere) criteria and 
align with the norm in order to perform the functions of ‘government’ and refinance existing debt 
obligations. A ‘social facticity’ forms; which is intimately linked to the regenerative hegemony of 
the discourse of (quantitative) risk and its false dichotomy with (qualitative) uncertainty. Their 
construction enables this social facticity.  
Unfortunately, separated into opposing ontological categories, risk and uncertainty are 
treated as brute facts; which skews the assessment of uncertain fiscal relations and distorts 
contingent liabilities. This fallacious analytics of ratings – the constituent components and processes 
involved in the construction of a credit score – helps elevate quantitative forms of expertise and 
relegates qualitative ones in the construction of these social facts. It subjects European budgetary 
politics to an artificial uniformity exogenous of national contexts as it privileges disinflationary 
logics aligned with self-systemic, and thereby self-regulating, forms of what may be identified as 
‘neoliberal’ capitalism (see Friedman, 1962) as the prescribed normality. An antagonistic 
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relationship develops between the programmatic/expertise and operational/politics dimensions of 
budgetary governance as heterogeneous (continental) forms of European capitalism are increasingly 
under attack. Rather than reversing the tide, I posit that a new set of inadequate EU regulatory 
technical standards (RTS) may serve to promote this dualism, and hence the asymmetry between 
CRAs and the EU. 
But neither risk nor uncertainty is inherently more or less abundant during the sovereign debt 
crisis. Better considered as modalities of governance, they render the problem of budgetary 
profligacy intelligible as a particular form of reason, aligned with perceptions of contingency and 
normality, and interwoven into the political discourse of Member States. Sovereign ratings, 
therefore, are the internal forms of governmentality involved in the ‘reiteration, re-establishment and 
sedimentation’ (Butler, 2010: 149) of this austere politics of limits underpinning European, and most 
global budgetary relations.  
Destabilizing effects result, however, as the degree of exigency involved in fiscal politics 
does not lend itself to being readily captured as a statistical probability through the calculus of risk 
(de Goede, 2004; Knight, 1921; O’Malley, 2004). Rather than promoting convergence through 
compliance, the depoliticization implied in, and following from, sovereign ratings predicated on risk 
proves unstable as austerity imposes unbearable socio-political costs on the populations of 
heterogeneous Member States. If excessively pressured, fiscal sovereignty unleashes unsuspecting 
forces contingent on the ‘singular nature of sovereignty’ and its vicissitudes (Moody’s Investor 
Services, 2008a: 6). This volatility precipitates fiscal, as well as socio-political, contestation and 
crisis – visible across Europe – thus opening spaces for the renegotiation of competing visions of 
budgetary normality (i.e. growth-oriented), and attempts by Member States to reclaim lost fiscal 
sovereignty. 
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 In developing this position, the article suggests that the RTS threaten to amplify the 
performativity of ratings. Without a revision in the analytics of ratings, they can reinforce the 
authority of CRAs at the expense of democratic governments. The hegemony of risk in the 
constitution of sovereign creditworthiness invalidates how competing notions of budgetary normality 
are ascertained and articulated, such as by politicians or civil society. To show this, I begin with how 
sovereign bond ratings are conducted and some of the serious inconsistencies in the analytics of 
ratings underpinning the politics of creditworthiness. Here the performative force of sovereign 
ratings is discussed in relation to the modalities of risk and uncertainty. After a reconstruction of the 
potential breakdown of this performativity, I analyze the RTS to reveal how they can serve to 
normalize this volatile politics of limits, which privileges the discourse of risk over the government 
through uncertainty, and thus amplify the self-validating/self-generative effects on CRAs, 
constitutive effects on investors, and unintended (prohibitive) consequences for national 
governments. As crisis shocks the EU, the authoritative capacity of ratings to instill the separation 
between the economy and politics diminishes as fiscal sovereignty reasserts itself.   
 
Unpacking Sovereign Ratings 
Broad in product diversification, the extent of the sovereign ratings issued by the ‘big three’ dwarfs 
that of their nearest rival. Moody’s and S&P, by far, are the most dominant players in the space; 
Fitch remains a notable, but distant third (White, 2002). Whereas by 2011, Kroll Bond Ratings 
(2011) rated a mere 59 sovereigns, S&P (2011a) issued 126 sovereign ratings, Moody’s (2011b) 
112, and Fitch 107. Extrapolated to the broader context, the scale of this dominance becomes even 
more pronounced. In 2009, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2009) calculated 
that the big three CRAs were responsible for a staggering 97% of all outstanding ratings across all 
categories. Given their poor track record, however, the authority and resiliency of Moody’s or S&P 
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to remain at the heart of finance is somewhat of an enigma. What has unnerved governments around 
the globe – but especially in Europe – is the questionable use of this sustained authority which, in 
part, CRAs derive from their monopoly over the constitution of a (neoliberal) politics of 
creditworthiness (European Commission, 2009).  
Blamed for escalating market turmoil through their procyclical behavior, credit ratings are 
increasingly under the scrutiny of regulators worldwide like the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 
2010) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010). Seldom, however, has this litany of alleged 
abuses translated into a comprehensive and effective regulatory response capable of correcting some 
of their most dubious elements. Recent legislation in the US (Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006) 
may have introduced criteria clarifying what designations, such as the ‘Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations’ (NRSRO), actually entail but Partnoy (1999: 684) cynically equates 
such recognition to bestowing CRAs with ‘regulatory licenses’. In addition to issuing credit 
statements, once ratings are incorporated into regulation, this scheme encourages CRAs to sell the 
‘valuable property rights associated with compliance with that regulation’ (ibid). Yet if it were only 
a matter of the ‘merit regulation’ (Schwarcz, 2002: 21) of ‘gatekeepers’ (Partnoy, 2006), where 
‘revenues flowing to rating agencies are rents from a government-generated monopoly’ (Sinclair, 
2010: 103), then the recourse simply would be to strip CRAs of this legal right/certification (Pollock, 
2005). But it is not that simple. Although, in 2009, the SEC began a campaign to remove the 
NRSRO reference from statutes, I argue that the tenacious (authoritative) capacity of ratings must be 
carefully considered in relation to how they perform a neoliberal politics of creditworthiness, which 
reinforces their epistocratic grip over democratic forms of rule.   
Contributing to the enduring control which CRAs exercise over the construction of the 
politics of limits is their purported ability to divorce technoscientific epistemology from its messy 
politico-economic context. Defendable risk calculus – bolstered by the secretive and obscured nature 
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of the rating process – immunizes the act of rating from political debate. Sovereign ratings serve as 
‘fugitive social facts’ (Holmes and Marcus, 2005: 237). Analogous to Mackenzie’s (2005) ‘black 
boxes’ – procedures whose overly technical internal structures make them opaque to outsiders –
sovereign ratings must be unpacked in order to help elucidate how they shape the politics of 
creditworthiness. With an affinity for what Maurer (2002: 29) identifies as the ‘fetishization of the 
normal distribution curve’, CRAs betray their ‘desire to replicate the prescriptive and predictive 
success of the hard sciences and a belief in the infallibility of rationalist-empirical epistemology’ 
(Jarvis and Griffiths, 2007: 17). Whether predictive positivism of this sort, however, helps us acquire 
‘objective’ knowledge about fiscal behavior is a misplaced enquiry. Given the uncertainty of 
budgetary politics, this risk-dominant approach searches for certainty equivalence that just does not 
exist. 
Sovereign rating ranges rest on a judgment – codified and commercialized as the ‘risk of 
default’ – about ‘the capacity and willingness’ of governments to raise the necessary resources for 
the timely servicing of their debt obligations (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008a: 4). Probability of 
payment depends on the tolerability and costs of austerity. Based on a synthesis of quantitative and 
qualitative factors, ratings communicate how well a government adheres to specific disinflationary 
logics aligned with Anglo-American versions of capitalism. Binding concessions are thought to 
prevent governments from compromising stable prices, which helps protect the value of assets, and 
keeps interest rates low (Roy, Denzau and Willet, 2007). As a form of expertise, therefore, ratings 
have a ‘programmatic’ dimension. Closest convergence earns the coveted, but evermore elusive, 
‘AAA’ grade. Thus, the salience of sovereign ratings derives from how persuasively they manage to 
constitute this neoliberal notion of budgetary rectitude as the hegemonic discourse against which 
democratic governments are judged and managed.  
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What frustrates this risk-centered neoliberal program, I argue, is the ‘operational’ dimension 
of fiscal relations; especially on the periphery of Europe. Estimated ‘political risks’, such as a 
‘government's payment culture’ (Standard & Poor’s, 2007) or a regime’s ‘legitimacy’ (Moody’s 
Investor Services, 1991: 165), are fluid and fail to repeat themselves at regular intervals. The ‘pain’ 
threshold which a constituency can endure fluctuates according to its changing political economy. It 
escapes prescient quantification as a probability distribution through the utilitarian calculus of risk. 
Political risks actually resemble political uncertainties. Accordingly, the greater degree of informal 
judgment which is required in their assessment opens the rating process to contestation about what 
‘correct’ and ‘normal’ fiscal conduct should entail. Unique political economies are not as amenable 
to conforming to aggregating (risk) techniques and the uniform self-systemic/self-regulating logics 
of neoliberal capitalism which they promote. Antagonisms arise with their imposition which, if 
excessive, provoke a backlash against harsh cuts (e.g. anti-government ‘sit-ins’ in Madrid or mass 
strikes in Greece).  
Even CRAs themselves experience a difficult time interpreting fiscal contingencies in their 
forecasts of credit risk. For example, when France lost its ‘AAA’ rating on 13 January 2012, S&P 
(2012a) recognized that the government’s attempts to deliver ‘growth-enhancing structural 
measures’ could ‘run counter to powerful national interest groups’. Unions and other civil society 
organizations have been protesting against painful budget cuts across the continent. These political 
disruptions – galvanized by deeper austerity – threaten to dissuade governments from implementing 
the structural reforms seen to raise output. At the same time, however, S&P (2012a) also admits that 
a ‘reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating’. Lacking 
knowledge of the necessary balance between stimulus and austerity – given the numerous 
outstanding uncertainties which inhibit their predictive capabilities – CRAs still prescribe an 
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approach to fiscal management which privileges the mentality of financial markets rather than that of 
electorates.      
Sensitivity to context-specific political developments is necessary for an accurate notion of 
the resiliency of a nation to political shocks. Variegated notions of budgetary normality and 
differentiated ratings, however, are not accommodated by the aggregating techniques of risk which 
dominate the rating process. Such an analysis would preclude the ‘narrow rating range’ for which 
Moody’s strives; even though the company admits that ‘the unusual characteristics of sovereign 
credit may not be fully captured by this approach’ (Moody’s Investor Services, 2008a: 1). Yet, as the 
next sections demonstrate, through risk there is a concerted effort to mask the informal judgment 
necessary to assess sovereign creditworthiness. Unfortunately, I argue that this recursive search for 
certainty equivalence in the budgetary relations of (European) governments leaves CRAs susceptible 
to misrepresenting fiscal politics while distorting their own contingent liabilities involved in the 
construction of these sovereign credit scores. 
For this purpose, recent research from the fields of the ‘social studies of finance’ (Callon, 
1998; Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2005; Langley, 2008; MacKenzie, 2006) and the ‘analytics of 
government’ (Aitken, 2007; Dean, 1999; O’Malley, 2004) provide the necessary analytical tools, 
which conventional international political economy (IPE) lacks, to appreciate how the infrastructure 
of referentiality underpinning the politics of creditworthiness is (discursively) constituted. Meaning 
and materiality must be studied together. Ratings act as a socio-technical device of control through 
which (European) sovereign debt is made into a ‘problem of government’ (Rose, 1999). In short, 
how ratings represent ‘correct’ and ‘normal’ budgetary conduct, as a social fact and goal for which 
to strive, is central to their legitimation and the performativity of this EU space; as well as the 
subjectivities within it. 
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Two analytical tools are deployed to help us come to terms with this capacity. First, 
‘deconstruction’ exposes how, framed as binary opposites, the dialectical relationship between risk 
and uncertainty is distorted; thereby embedding risk as the dominant modality informing this 
performativity. Second, ‘reconstruction’ shows how this dubious fiscal normality – upon which the 
politics of limits surrounding sovereign debt are based – is fraught with perils and vulnerable to 
crisis. Without a ‘felicitous set of circumstances’ (Butler, 2010: 151) anchored in the realities of 
national budgetary sovereignty, the predication on the hegemonic discourse of risk fails to prevent 
crisis as its prescribed austerity conflicts with indigenous forms of capitalism to unleash forces of 
instability.   
 
Judging Sovereigns 
CRAs claim not to design ratings as a probabilistically quantifiable frequency denoting the credit 
event of default or expected loss, but rather as ordinal rankings of credit risk. Nevertheless, attempts 
to frame key (qualitative) political determinants, such as the stability and legitimacy of political 
institutions or the transparency of policy decisions, in absolute risk terms are quite apparent. This 
makes them more tractable to the rational choice scenarios and stress tests implicit in CRA propriety 
models. The purpose is to translate more uncertain (political) events into statistical regularities; 
which enhances the epistocratic leverage of CRAs over the politics of limits. Yet, whereas the higher 
incidence of bankruptcies in the private sector may make risk probabilities more convincing for 
corporates, sovereigns rarely default. Ecuador was negligent in November 2008 and more notable 
was Argentina in November 2001. Greece’s March 2012 managed default, however, was the largest 
sovereign debt restructuring in history – wiping about US$ 130 billion from an outstanding balance 
of US$ 430 billion (The Economist, 17 March 2012) – and the first developed country to default in 
more than 60 years. Future (disorderly) defaults remain a serious threat. Nevertheless, sovereign 
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bonds are treated identically to corporate debt – structured finance is a separate category – and lack 
any specific provisions in the CRA regulation. It is the discretionary conduct of rating committees 
that compensates for this lack of representative data samples and similar quantitative inconsistencies 
in the construction of ratings. Unfortunately, as I argue, this judgment is muted through the 
‘objectifying cloak of economic and financial analysis’ (Sinclair, 2005: 34).  
For example, S&P’s (2011b) Rating Analysis Methodology Profile (RAMP) employs a one 
(the best) to six (the worst) scale that seeks the quantitative capture of the five analytical (sovereign) 
categories it monitors: (1) political score – political risks and institutional effectiveness; (2) 
economic score – economic structure and growth prospects; (3) fiscal score – fiscal flexibility and 
debt burden; (4) external score – external liquidity and international investment position; and (5) 
monetary score – monetary flexibility. Available for public consumption, these criteria are 
incorporated into various risk scenarios to calculate the economic resiliency and financial robustness 
of a government. Not surprisingly, the closer the alignment with policies of austerity, the higher the 
awarded score. But whereas the assessment of individual categories, and in particular those 
economic in nature, may be calculated quantitatively, much more perplexing is how they all factor 
into an aggregate grade.   
S&P admits that these ‘analytical variables are interrelated and the weights are not fixed, 
either across sovereigns or across time’ (Standard & Poor’s, 2008: 2). If so, then this scoring slope 
(RAMP) that produces the comparative fiscal normality against which peers are assessed is 
artificially static, and therefore erroneous outside of the strict confines of its underlying assumptions; 
which attempt to ‘freeze’ fluid fiscal relations via ceteris paribus clauses. Disaggregating 
governments into so many components, judging these individually before reassembling them also 
cannot adequately account for their interdependencies and interplay in shaping the debt-bearing 
capacity of an entire nation.  
 12 
 
 
Although these categories are transparent, the CRA analytical process, whereby the 
quantitative (risk) and qualitative (uncertainty) are synthesized to render a rating, is secretive and, as 
I contend, distorted. Neither the RAMP scores nor their assumptions are ever revealed. Doing so 
would force CRAs to justify their discretionary conduct, or government through uncertainty, as they 
try to explain the ‘special’ status of sovereigns (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008a: 5). Irrespective of 
the preponderance of quantitative analysis, it fails to account for the ‘constantly mutating formation’ 
of ‘contingent social arrangements’ (Barry and Slater, 2005: 14). Open to contestation, the ensuing 
debates would challenge the virtual monopoly of CRAs over the constitution of authoritative 
knowledge underpinning the problem of sovereign creditworthiness. Of course, S&P is not unique in 
this respect.  
Before analyzing debt dynamics, Moody’s first focuses on the ‘resiliency’ of a country and 
its shock-absorbing capacity. Substantial degrees of uncertainty-centered management are also 
evident in the ‘steps’ that it takes in the determination of a sovereign bond rating. In the first 
instance, ‘economic resiliency’ is based on the ‘quality of a country’s institutional framework and 
governance’ – including nebulous and contingent factors like the ‘predictability of government 
action’ and ‘the degree of consensus on the key goals of political action’ (Moody’s Investor 
Services, 2008a: 2). ‘Tolerability’ of adjustment costs (Factor 3) only compounds devising a 
standardized norm against which ‘government financial robustness’ can be measured (Moody’s 
Investor Services, 2008a). Nevertheless, comparable metrics are at the core of the rating process.  
Both Moody’s and the Commission acknowledge that sovereigns are unique given their: 
exorbitant privilege of taxation, a very high probability of survival (countries rarely 
disappear), a lack of superior judiciary authority to make debt resolution predictable  
and a limited sample skewed towards very high ratings for which there is almost no 
experience of default. (Moody’s Investor Services, 2008a: 5) 
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As a result: 
it is difficult to deconstruct what is ‘pure’ probability of default and what is pure  
‘loss severity’ at times of default. In fact, this is almost impossible for countries that  
are high in the rating spectrum (unless there is a clearly discernible, yet unlikely,  
default scenario). (Moody’s Investor Services, 2008a: 5) 
To produce this narrow rating range, and thus the permissible threshold against which Member 
States are synchronically standardized – in comparison to any other political economy – qualitative 
(informal) judgment is paramount. Where uncertainty prevails, Moody's concedes that it will 
‘normally assign a rating based on its perception of the most likely outcome’ rather than ‘assign a 
rating based simply on a probability weighting of the outcomes’ (Moody’s Investor Services, 2002: 
5, added italics). But lacking a systematic ‘formula for combining these scores to arrive at a ratings 
decision’ (Standard & Poor’s, 1992: 15), it is primarily through the ‘continuous effort to make the 
analysis more quantitative’ (Moody’s Investor Services, 2008a: 6) that ratings command and sustain 
their authority. Hegemonic risk calculus serves as their legitimizing force.  
If sovereign ratings, to a large degree, are subjective estimations susceptible to serious 
inconsistencies and bias (Johnson et al, 1990), we must determine what justifies the scope and 
salience of these ‘informed opinions’; especially given their significance but dismal record of failure. 
As the next section deconstructs, the deliberate discounting of uncertainty-based practices, in favor 
of a defendable calculus of risk, prejudices how the problem of sovereign creditworthiness is 
constituted to privilege quantitative means, which helps normalize an adherence to epistocratic 
dictates – often irrespective of their accuracy – and exacerbates the asymmetry between CRAs and 
governments. Amplified by a fallacious quantitative/qualitative distortion in the analytics of ratings, 
this obscures how contingent liabilities factor into the production of CRA judgments; which would 
otherwise detract from their clout. Individual rating agencies, however, have their own institutional 
 14 
 
 
protocols, corporate identities and analysts that influence the various stages of rating design. Without 
any serious consideration of their discursive constitution, and compounded by an unhindered 
deference to exogenous quantitative analysis, this often amounts to the misrepresentation of 
uncertainties as risks. Unless the EU targets how uncertainty is deployed – rather than focusing 
primarily on risk-based practices – then it seems incapable of improving the quality of sovereign 
ratings.  
 
Uncertainty of Rating Sovereign Debt 
To appreciate how ratings shape the politics of creditworthiness and the danger of EU policy 
undermining its own ambitions, we must first understand the way that CRAs operationalize risk and 
uncertainty. In large part, their authoritative capacity is commensurate with how well ratings 
eliminate the perception of imperfect information and forecast the chance of convergence around a 
devised notion of fiscal normality. Orthodoxy dictates that the more supposed uncertainty that CRAs 
replace with risk, as they attempt to aggregate contingent fiscal relations into a calculable measure of 
variance around an expected value – represented as ‘AAA’ – the more consequential ratings become. 
Expertise mediates this representational process which, in the ratings space, I argue is consistently 
aligned with a utilitarian calculus of risk that inculcates disinflationary neoliberal logics. Technical 
expertise, as Sinclair (1994: 454) reminds us, gives the impression that Moody’s or S&P ‘disavow 
any ideological content to their rating judgments’. Devoid of ‘interfering variables’, such as human 
discretion, what is a social fact appears to be transformed into objective knowledge as the calculation 
of an indeterminate fiscal future is purported to become tractable to defendable risk management 
(O’Malley, 2004: 16).  
Adhering to a predictive positivism, the discussion turns to calculating the ontological 
coordinates of something called ‘risk’ – in juxtaposition to an ‘uncertainty’ – whereby a fictitious 
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dichotomy between the quantitative (risk) and qualitative (uncertainty) is promoted. Here the former 
is perceived as a tangible phenomenon tractable to rational choice modeling and equilibrating 
outcomes but uncertainty cannot be assigned a definite numerical probability (Hardy, 1923; Short, 
1992). Conceptualized by popular accounts as a by-product of modernity, uncertainty is often 
thought of as an ‘incalculable risk’ to be feared, as espoused by the ‘risk society’ thesis (Beck, 1992; 
Beck, Giddens and Lash, 1994), or celebrated (Bernstein, 1998). Technological advancements (e.g. 
statistical actuarialism) and enhanced information supposedly enable experts, such as auditors or 
rating agencies, to patrol the margins of indeterminacy between risk and uncertainty. With the right 
‘tools’, they claim to translate more contingent events into statistical probabilities; which help 
predict a Pareto-optimal equilibrium (Reddy, 1996). As Hacking (1990) reminds us, knowledge as 
statistics translates economic relations into a manipulable field for management. CRAs attempt to 
extend this approach to fiscal relations.  
A strict binary opposition, however, between risk and uncertainty should be avoided. Rather 
than one of mutual exclusion or innate abundance/scarcity, their relationship, as O’Malley (2000) 
contends, is contestable and heteromorphic. As constructs, they change depending on how they are 
deployed. Accordingly, this discussion is about how CRAs govern ‘through’ risk and uncertainty 
rather than ‘things’ labeled as such. Searching for some exogenous fiscal realities to unearth, or the 
management ‘of’ risk and uncertainty, only subjects us to a false dualism.   
Determining the actual displacement of one thing called ‘uncertainty’ by the other named 
‘risk’, in a painstaking attempt to identify their supposed ontological properties, saddles us with the 
burden of trying to calculate the exact frequencies of fluid fiscal relations at any one point in time. 
But risk is in a permanent state of virtuality (Van Loon, 2002: 2). Once it happens, and a static figure 
is available, it is now a full-blown crisis and no longer a probability. Not only are attempts to capture 
it as a fixed event elusive and blind to the dialectical relationship between risk and uncertainty but 
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they distract from the more interesting governmental puzzle; namely how the modalities of risk and 
uncertainty help to discursively construct and legitimatize Member State debt as a ‘knowable, 
calculable and administrable object’ of government (Miller and Rose, 1990: 5). Here credit ratings 
are regarded an internal form of governmentality underpinning budgetary relations as opposed to 
brute facts.  
Sinclair (2005: 65-66) attributes the leverage that CRAs exert over global capital markets to 
the historical institutionalization of norms and rules surrounding creditworthiness, or the ‘embedded 
knowledge network’. As significant, however, as their historical presence has been to contributing to 
the power of Moody’s or S&P, it does not fully explain how they have managed to sustain this 
authority in the face of a consistent stream of failures and lackluster performance. Neither is their 
monopolistic position in itself satisfactory as poor ratings can be ignored. Arguably, their 
authoritative capacity is constituted through the performative effects of ratings, which create the 
conditions and subjectivities that serve to validate this epistemic/discursive framework, and thus 
their utility and leverage. Performativity combines this relationship between action and authority. 
Hegemonic risk discourse is at the centre of this depoliticization process (Dean, 1999; Power, 2004). 
Through the (disproportionate) operationalization and commercialization of risk practices, CRAs 
reinforce the authoritative capacity of sovereign ratings to act on market participants and 
governments in the constitution of a neoliberal politics of creditworthiness.      
 
Performativity of Ratings  
In his widely acclaimed contribution to the performativity literature, The Laws of Markets, Callon 
(1998: 23) argues that economic theories and methods ‘do not merely record a reality independent of 
themselves; they contribute powerfully to shaping, simply be measuring it, the reality that they 
measure’. Given their procedural dimension, as a discursive practice, sovereign ratings have 
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‘illocutionary’ performative effects (Austin, 1962; Callon, 2010). Through their description of 
budgetary positions, such as ‘junk’ (below ‘BBB-’), these utterances communicate a range of 
judgments about proper fiscal conduct, which inform the constitution of a politics of limits or the 
fiscal constraints facing governments. Formulated through a readily identifiable scale, ratings are 
how this (neoliberal) normative statement about creditworthiness gets translated into practice. 
Adopted and applied by market participants, ratings help constitute a social facticity which may 
otherwise not exist.     
But ratings are not simply a linguistic process. These austere politics of creditworthiness 
have ‘perlocutionary’ performative effects on the broader EU assemblage since they depend on the 
reality produced by said ratings in order to dictate successfully how fiscal sovereignty should be 
exercised. The effective control of ratings to provoke the prescribed disinflationary management of 
Member State finances is intimately linked to the naturalization of the neoliberal logics implied in 
and promoted by said ratings. Performativity in action, or what Callon (2007: 330) refers to as 
‘performation’, ‘encompasses [the] expression, self-fulfilling prophesies, prescription, and 
performance’ of varying degrees of budgetary prudence or profligacy, which endow the problem of 
Member State debt with social facticity and create the conditions where it is enacted and reproduced. 
Action and authority combine to ‘govern-at-a-distance’ (Miller and Rose, 1990); with effects on 
three subjectivities implicated in the debt crisis: governments, CRAs, and investors. As a socio-
technical device of control, ratings connect notions of proper fiscal conduct (i.e. neoliberal 
orthodoxy) to economic behavior (of states and market participants).    
Through this performation, control as calculation is revealed and institutionalized (Deleuze, 
1995). Sovereign ratings have a ‘programmatic’ effect of modulating budgetary conduct. Whereas 
discipline entails both individualization and normalization, regimes of control regulate deviance 
rather than fundamentally reform the actor. As long as either Italy or Portugal behaves in a manner 
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conducive to achieving a higher investment grade, then whether they have truly embraced the 
neoliberal mentality is secondary. Outcomes matter for CRAs. That is unless, as I contend, the 
performation generates tensions/shocks – illustrated by the social costs of the debt crisis – that focus 
on its politics. An antagonistic relationship between the programmatic/expertise and 
operational/politics dimensions of fiscal governance develops; which pits the two competing logics 
of legitimacy (in the eyes of financial markets) and accountability (to citizens) against each other. If, 
according to CRAs, ‘political imperatives only compromise economic fundamentals, impeding the 
efficient operation of the market mechanism’ (Hay, 2007: 56), then political discretion, or the 
‘operational’ dimension of budgetary management, is a liability to be mitigated. Otherwise, deviance 
from the prescribed fiscal normality brings about public consequences.  
To dampen the potential adverse effects that democratic politics may have on 
creditworthiness, and on the predictive power of ratings themselves, a bifurcation between politics 
and economics is promoted. Technocratic governments are seen by CRAs as typically superior in 
implementing the structural reforms necessary to manage the crisis. Subsequently, their ‘political 
risk’ scores are better; though not disseminated. Through this depoliticization of the budgetary 
process, self-generative effects are visible for rating agencies. Ratings function as self-validating 
feedback loops (Callon, 2007; Hacking, 1999). They ‘“perform” the market by helping to create and 
sustain the entities [they] postulate’ (Guala, 2007: 135). Better political risk scores are indicative of, 
relatively, more stable and prudent (technocratic) governments. So significant are these political 
measures that a score of ‘6’ precludes a sovereign from obtaining a higher rating than ‘BB+’, 
irrespective of its net asset position (Standard and Poor’s, 2011b: 9). This helps validate the CRA 
opinion that political discretion should be minimized; lest it jeopardize creditworthiness. For 
example, S&P (2012a) commends the Italian government of Mario Monti for having, in its words: 
stepped up initiatives to modernize [Italy’s] economy and secure the sustainability of 
 19 
 
 
public finances over the long term. We consider that the domestic political management  
of the crisis has improved markedly in Italy. Therefore, we have not changed our political 
risk score for Italy because we are of the opinion that the weakening policy environment  
at the European level is to a sufficient degree offset by Italy's stronger domestic capacity  
to formulate and implement crisis-mitigating economic policies. 
As governments initially change to conform to the austere prescriptions implicit in ratings and 
investors react based on these accounts, ratings – however accurate – are legitimized. In short, 
ratings yield self-generating effects for CRAs.  
Procyclicality only reinforces these self-validating effects as downgrades and ‘negative 
outlooks’ create the deteriorating conditions for further ratings cuts. As fiscal positions continue to 
worsen, recessionary pressures grow, which, if persistent, serve to validate the smoothing rule’s 
prescription of additional downgrades implicit in the ‘through-the-cycle’ (TTC) rating methodology. 
During economic contractions, such as the current crisis, the probability of a downgrade grows 
substantially; whereas in an upswing, the probability of upgrades increases (Lowe, 2002). Most 
downgrades, however, occur once a crisis has already begun. The TTC approach suffers from a lag 
as it ‘waits to detect whether the degradation is more permanent than temporary and larger than one 
notch’ which tends to ‘accentuate the already negative movement in credit quality’ (IMF, 2010; xiii). 
Evidence (Haldane et al, 2000) confirms this procyclical time lag. Only in less than 25% of cases 
have Moody’s and S&P cut a sovereign rating before the onset of a correction.  
Applied to the present crisis, Gärtner, Griesbach and Jung (2011) calculate that the periphery 
misfits (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) have been excessively downgraded. For example, the 
difference between Ireland’s ‘systematic’ rating, as a function of economic and structural variables 
alone, and its actual credit score reveals a substantial increase in the ‘arbitrary component’ of the 
grade – ‘defined as what is left unexplained by observed previous procedures of rating agencies’ 
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(Gärtner et al, 2011: 3). Especially pronounced after 2009/2010, not only does this discretionary 
element exacerbate the situation facing these Member States by raising risk premia (i.e. yield 
spreads), but the ‘arbitrary rating downgrades trigger processes of self-fulfilling prophecy’ that only 
fuel the sovereign debt crisis (Gärtner et al, 2011: 2). Procyclicality exhibits is own (amplifying) 
feedback effects which strengthen the position of CRAs. As governments go into damage control 
mode, the threat of systemic disruption looms.  
Another ominous prospect stems from the constitutive effects of risk-centered ratings for 
investors. Arguably, a primary appeal of ratings is as an inexpensive form of outsourced due 
diligence. Given the uncertainty in calculating the risk of sovereign default, bond fund managers and 
banks attempt to minimize such costs while searching for potential arbitrage opportunities (Beunza 
et al, 2006; Partnoy, 2006: 78). In addition to hedge-based and other investment strategies, ratings 
enable investors to capitalize on the variance in creditworthiness between Member States. 
Synchronically connected, heterogeneous economies become comparable as ratings help determine 
who is eligible to access liquid capital markets and at what cost. In short, the institutionalization of 
ratings helps constitute ‘speculators’ as it equips them with an arsenal of tools with which to exploit 
the relative vulnerability of national governments. Because portfolio/asset managers are often 
required to buy investment grade securities, investors are modulated to accept the authority of 
ratings as they complement their business ambitions. Jumping into the fray are hedge funds. With 
the massive offloading of downgraded European debt, they are taking advantage of discounts of up 
to 50% (Habbard, 2012). Whether the accuracy of these ratings, such as ‘junk’, is precise is really of 
secondary significance as profits are made from arbitrage and movements in comparable prices.  
Effects are especially pronounced with a transition to ‘speculative’ grade issues (Cantor and 
Packer 1995: 37). When Moody’s (2011c) downgraded Portugal to ‘Ba2’ from ‘Baa1’ (negative 
outlook) on 05 July 2011, and into junk territory – citing a growing risk of a second bailout – it sent 
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the markets tumbling. Although not completely unexpected, the euro depreciated, the UK FSTE 100 
index fell below the psychological 6000 mark (5988), and fears of contagion spread as Portugal’s 
10-year bonds surged above 13% to a euro-era record against German Bunds. As market sentiment 
quickly deteriorated, the procyclicality of the negative forecast was confirmed first by Fitch (‘BB+’ 
on 24 November 2011) and then by S&P (‘BB’ on 13 January 2012). Without any serious evaluation 
of the finance ministry’s accusation that ‘serious inconsistencies’ existed in S&P’s rating 
methodology, the ‘BB’ utterance was sufficient enough for a similar sell-off. With subsequent 
rebalancing, the benchmark 10-year bond yield shot up to another record of above 17% (Financial 
Times, 30 January 2012). Lacking time and a reliable approach to assess these judgments, market 
participants incorporate and act on these credit scores to create the conditions which help validate 
the assumptions implicit in the rating. With each subsequent downgrade, debt burdens grow and the 
capability of Member States to stimulate economic growth is hindered. Over time, this normalizes an 
increasing adherence to ratings.     
Ratings, per se, are not problematic. If fact, their marginal utility is debatable as sophisticated 
market participants (e.g. PIMCO, Paulson & Co.) perform their own comprehensive analyzes 
(Partnoy, 2002; Schwarcz, 2002). Failure to conduct proper internal risk assessments often 
precipitates a crisis. Outsourced due diligence may represent value of simplicity but accuracy 
suffers. Readily adopted scores generated by opaque proprietary models is one thing. Even more 
precarious, however, is the embeddedness of ratings in regulatory and contractual architecture. Not 
only does it intensify their spill-over effects (ECB, 2011; IMF, 2010) but it acts to normalize them. 
External ratings – primarily through their ‘certification’ role1 – diminish the sense of urgency 
for investors to replicate such tests. As a socio-technical device of control, the performative effect of 
ratings – through their reiteration of fiscal rectitude an exogenous/tangible risk – is to impede the 
endogenous responsibility of market participants to manage through their own uncertainty. Readily 
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accepted, external ratings inhibit the internalization of self-regulation or regulation based on one’s 
own circumstances. Given the rapid sell-offs and spikes in risk premia witnessed immediately after a 
rating action, such as in Portuguese case, rarely do the vast majority of market participants seriously 
study the validity of these judgments before making that transaction. Even if rating actions confirm 
what has already been priced into the market, previous ratings and outlooks typically factor into 
those expectations (Sinclair, 2005). Now as the discretionary conduct of both politicians and 
investors becomes marginalized, the authority of self-systemic market logics (read risk discourse) in 
the constitution of the politics of limits is further cemented. 
 
Performativity Breakdown and Crisis 
As revealing as the deconstruction of the analytics of ratings is to helping us better understand their 
authoritative capacity, it is not the entire story. The practical adoption of sovereign ratings, and thus 
an adherence to their neoliberal program can, in fact, serve to hinder convergence towards their 
prescribed fiscal normality. Reconstruction shows that, in the European context, ratings may actually 
precipitate the ‘converse’ of what they describe to alter national political economies ‘in such a way 
that [their] empirical accuracy...is undermined’; or what MacKenzie (2006: 19) labels as 
‘counterperformativity’. In this instance, however, it is not the empirical validity of the model itself 
(read sovereign ratings) that is the focus. Their fallacious analytics of ratings have already been 
dissected above to show how they distort fiscal relations and mask contingent liabilities by 
misrepresenting uncertainties as risks. Of significance here is how sovereign ratings can jeopardize 
their own programmatic ambitions by creating the very conditions which refute their disinflationary 
rationalities and further impair their calculative capability. Excessive austerity and a crippling 
adherence to neoliberal precepts can go too far and impose that ‘intolerable economic sacrifice on 
populations’ (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008a: 6); which triggers violent resistance and national 
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efforts to reclaim fiscal sovereignty. Instead of appeasing financial markets, at this juncture, 
governments move to protect their people. There are three elements to this performativity 
breakdown.  
 First, in compliance with the prescriptive normativity of ratings, governments implement the 
harsh austerity measures thought to improve their credit scores. With the EU projecting an increase 
in eurozone debt from 66.3% of GDP in 2007 to 92.7% in 2013, public expenditure on social 
programs have either been slashed, passed on to subnational governments through growing fiscal 
decentralization or both (European Commission, 2012: 18). For example, the overhaul of health care 
systems across the periphery of Europe has resulted in deep expenditure cuts – 25% (US$ 12 billion) 
in Greece alone (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2012: 13). Falling tax 
revenues only compound the problem as Member States fall back into recession.  
 Second, and following from the above, socio-political contestation abounds regarding the 
adverse effects of such a policy direction on economic growth and the provision of public goods. 
Rather than improving the crisis, adherence to this disinflationary fiscal rectitude may only be 
intensifying the downturn. Constrained budgetary stimulus produces procyclical effects, which 
further dampen economic growth. Coupled with climbing unemployment – EMU rate in August 
2012 was 11.4% compared to 10.2% the previous year – and plummeting welfare levels, austerity 
fatigue is setting in across Europe. Already, attempts to realign with an austere budgetary normality 
have triggered violent backlash and civil unrest; whereby the politics of resistance seeks to reclaim 
lost fiscal sovereignty. Soaring youth (under 25) unemployment is only fueling this volatile 
discontent.  
 Accordingly, Callon (2010: 164) is correct to assert that the success of illocutionary 
performativity is temporary because its capacity ‘to make inactive and invisible [its] overflowing 
and misfires’ for an extended period of time is dubious. There is a critical breaking point; after 
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which the performativity of ratings fails to engender successfully a disinflationary program as 
governments begin to take measured steps to repoliticize the discourse and enact policies to protect 
their citizens. When excessively pressured, governments have a variety of available options at their 
disposable to correct this asymmetry; including curtailing certain market activities, such as the 
partial ban on short-selling by France, Italy, Spain and Belgium demonstrated. Socialist party 
election victories in France and Greece may be indicative of this movement. Of course, the 
definition of ‘intolerable’ and whether these popular movements can sufficiently mobilize and 
organize to bring about such change is still being determined.  What is clearer, however, is that the 
antagonism between the programmatic/expertise and operational/politics dimensions of fiscal 
governance is growing; without any sign of abating.   
 Finally, given this intensifying tension, there is now even more political upheaval for rating 
agencies to assess and to factor into their calculation of the credit scores of Member States. Not only 
are these volatile dynamics less tractable to risk calculus but they demand a higher degree of 
informal judgment (read government through uncertainty) to help come to terms with their possible, 
but contingent, effects on sovereign creditworthiness. This makes ratings more susceptible to the 
bias and temperaments of rating committees, and thus inconsistencies (Johnson et al, 1990). In short, 
reconstruction shows that sovereign ratings have the potential to disrupt the very continuity upon 
which they depend and to undermine their own empirical validity. Budgetary politics is replete with 
numerous exigencies which, when excessively aggravated by a compliance to ratings, can randomly 
sabotage the programmatic ambitions of its surveillance to refute ratings; namely 
counterperformativity.  
Now whether these operational dynamics, in fact, are derived from some actual domains, 
which are either converging or diverging to become distinct liberal or co-ordinated market 
economies, only bogs us down with more questions about the ontological essence of social relations 
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or globalization. This is not to claim that notable differences do not exist between what has become 
identified as ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2002). Although any strict 
typology omits the contingency (institutional, cultural, etc…) and hybridization implicit in how the 
economy is organized and governed, a juxtaposition between Anglo-American and continental 
European rationalities and forms of capitalism illuminates the precarious relationship between the 
austere programmatic dimensions of ratings and the operational side of European social models. 
Substantial overlap does exist but those are empirical questions that are beyond the scope of this 
article.  
Given their disinflationary logics, neoliberal programs (i.e. austerity, privatization) often 
conflict with the capacity of Members States to privilege greater degrees of social democracy and 
solidarity through schemes such as protected public pensions or greater collective bargaining 
(Schmidt, 2002). From this perspective, Hay’s (2007: 257) observation that ‘powerful 
neoliberalizing tendencies…threaten the incremental dilution’ of continental forms of social 
democracy is compelling as it applies to sovereign ratings as a depoliticizing socio-technical device; 
which help promote a fictitious separation between the economy and politics. But this performativity 
is challenged by unique national contingencies that resist its imposition. General strikes, mass 
protests, or falling governments (e.g. Netherlands, France) across Europe may be the initial signs of 
counterperformativity. Rather than performing their depiction of correct fiscal conduct into 
existence, ratings, and the excessive austerity they promote, can risk undermining it. Procyclicality 
can exacerbate this movement.  
In order to remedy some of the most dubious elements of ratings, which can trigger these 
disruptive effects, and prevent this antagonism from boiling over, the EU has devised a new set of 
regulatory technical standards. The objective is to monitor CRA compliance with the CRA 
framework; thereby helping improve the predictive power of credit rating methodologies. It is 
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assumed that this will somehow curb the escalating tension between the agencies and Member States 
and redress the growing asymmetry. But, by problematizing the RTS, the following sections reveal 
how the EU regulatory response may amplify the performative effects of ratings to (inadvertently) 
sabotage its own ambitions to manage effectively the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Monitoring Rating Compliance  
At first glance, it appears that the EU is undertaking what are credible policy initiatives to correct 
some of the failures in financial supervision exposed by both the credit and sovereign debt crises. 
Upon the recommendations of the European Securities Markets Experts Group (ESME, 2008), 
chaired by Jacques de Larosière, the CRA framework focuses on three main areas: registration, 
conduct of business and supervision. Centralized oversight of ratings agencies at the EU level – the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is entrusted with launching investigations, 
conducting inspections, proposing fines and prohibiting operations – and a more rigorous 
methodology are thought to increase transparency and competition in the ratings space. Key 
stipulations include prohibiting CRAs from providing advisory services or from rating financial 
instruments without the sufficient quality information upon which to ground their opinions. Quality 
is of the utmost importance so the disclosure of models, methodologies and key assumptions used in 
ratings is also mandated. Unfortunately, devoid of the appropriate supervisory methods to ascertain 
how uncertainty is deployed in the construction of ratings, I posit that the EU’s capacity to monitor 
and manage CRAs is greatly circumscribed. 
Admitting that the existing rules – Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (CRA Regulation v1) and 
its amendment (EU) No 513/2011 (CRA Regulation v2) – are inadequate, the Commission (2011) 
proposed a new draft Directive and Regulation (v3) in late 2011. At the top of the agenda is 
improving the quality of sovereign debt ratings by making them more transparent and timely. 
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Transparency is also deemed essential in helping reduce investors’ overreliance on external ratings 
as well as in eliminating conflicts of interest and promoting accountability/liability among CRAs for 
their products. To verify compliance, ESMA drafted a set of regulatory technical standards. Article 
8(3) is the most significant, yet most ambiguous and contested section of the new regulatory 
framework. Touted as a unique ‘European touch’, it stipulates that ‘a credit rating agency should use 
rating methodologies that are rigorous, systematic, continuous and subject to validation based on 
historical experience, including back-testing’ (CRA Regulation v1). Undoubtedly, ESMA is serious 
about its supervisory role and ensuring that it has bite as well as bark. Upon closer examination, 
however, this article contends that, without correcting the fallacious analytics of ratings skewed 
towards risk, the RTS help enhance the legitimacy of what is a form of outsourced due diligence; 
thereby exacerbating the depoliticizing effects of ratings.  
Good governance is dependent on an appropriate set of preventative and corrective practices 
that can help achieve the programmatic ambitions of an organization without inhibiting its ability to 
adapt to the uncertainty of changing circumstances (Power, 2007). To apprehend and address the 
rapidly shifting parameters of global finance and safeguard financial stability, ‘it is necessary to 
identify, at an early stage, trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities stemming from the micro-
prudential level, across borders and across sectors’ (European Commission: DG EcFin, 2009: 19). 
For this purpose, ESMA has labored to tweak the August 2010 technical standards deployed to 
assess CRA compliance with Article 8(3) (CESR Ref. 10-945, CESR Guidance) developed by its 
predecessor, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). A draft Consultation Paper 
(ESMA, 2011a/303) was released on 19 September 2011, and the formal framework was submitted 
for endorsement at the beginning of 2012. It is already clear that substantive similarities exist which 
can threaten its mandate. Principal logics and methods embodied in the antecedent CESR Guidance 
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are transposed to the new RTS, which can reinforce the hegemony of risk discourse in the 
constitution of a neoliberal politics of limits.  
Risk played the dominant role in the CESR Guidance. Assessments relied heavily on 
probabilistic factors, such as probability of default, loss curves, and expected recovery rates (CESR, 
2010: 4). As noted above, even though CRAs claim that ratings are ordinal rankings, the EU also 
recognized how extensively statistical probabilities are applied in CRA propriety models. Rather 
than readdressing the problems of such an application to political/fiscal phenomena, both CESR 
(2010: 6) and ESMA (2011b/462, Art.4 (2a)) instruct CRAs simply to submit ‘the scope of 
qualitative judgment’ in these contestable areas. What this actually entails is quite ambiguous. In 
determining the appropriate level of assessment, ESMA (2011b: 22) ‘shall consider whether a credit 
rating methodology has a demonstrable history of consistency and accuracy in predicting 
creditworthiness’. ESMA is adamant about preventing interference with the analytical substance of 
CRA methodologies. This produces a twofold conundrum. On the one hand, ESMA wishes to fulfill 
its mandate without advocating strategic policy decisions. On the other hand, to correct the egregious 
elements of sovereign ratings, reduce their overreliance and improve their quality, it simply cannot 
support the status quo in regards to their constitution. Doing so may only accelerate the shift away 
from human competencies and the critical judgment of democratic rule towards the quantitative 
techniques of epistocracy. The RTS may act as a catalyst for this performation. 
 
Rigorous 
To begin with, the ‘rigorousness’ of rating methodologies is evaluated. Accuracy relies on 
uncompromising high standards. Robust precision is desirable. But deciphering whether Moody’s or 
S&P demonstrates having ‘incorporated all factors relevant in determining creditworthiness...which 
shall be supported by statistical, historical experience or evidence’ (ESMA, 2011b/462, Art.4 (1b), 
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added italics) or proving that any ‘assumptions and criteria are reliable, relevant’ and of ‘sufficient 
quality’ is mindboggling. How is statistical evidence or proof of reliability possible when calculating 
the ‘tolerability of debt’ encompasses such nebulous notions as the consensus surrounding political 
succession (Standard & Poor’s, 2008: 3) or a regime’s ‘legitimacy’ (Moody’s Investor Services, 
1991: 165)? If Moody’s (2008a: 6) itself admits that there are ‘no quantitative-based approaches that 
satisfactorily replace analysts’ disciplined judgment on these questions’ then how feasible is it for 
the EU to determine and assess the requisite degree of discretionary conduct involved in rating a 
sovereign? Not surprisingly, how the quantitative and qualitative parameters are accommodated and 
synthesized is never revealed by CRAs.  
Demanding a high level of description of qualitative inputs – including the ‘scope of 
qualitative judgment’ – presupposes some kind of standardized metric/benchmark, according to 
which subjective decisions about unique national fiscal positions can be made. Should such a 
formula readily be available or a qualified/competent appraiser exist then what precludes the EU 
itself from proposing a single method for calculating the risk of default? One definition would 
relieve the terrible burden of having to discriminate how discretionary judgment is applied by a host 
of agencies; each with their own proprietary models, corporate culture and institutional identity. As I 
argue, qualitative elements elude being captured through quantitative techniques. It is difficult to 
imagine how such opaque procedures can establish methodological rigorousness to yield anything 
but ambiguous and superficial conclusions.  
This can contribute to the self-generative effects for CRAs. Insofar as these obscure methods 
of assessments fail to target adequately the contingent liabilities implicit in the construction of 
ratings, they enable rating agencies to continue their operations without any substantial interference. 
Business is as usual if CRAs are only compelled to demonstrate what is essentially already available 
for public consumption. Unless ESMA defines what these ‘relevant’ or ‘suitable’ qualitative 
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variables are and how they should be synthesized then it will be left to the discretion of the rating 
agencies themselves to decide what satisfies these requirements. Cooptation of the supervisory 
analysis through the reinforcement of risk discourse in the definition of the problem of sovereign 
debt is possible as vague criteria and nondescript labels are open for interpretation. ESMA’s 
adherence to non-interference simply makes it more vulnerable. Of course, as argued above, self-
validating practices for CRAs often invalidate competing notions of what is credible and correct 
fiscal policy. These unintended consequences can undermine regulatory control by cementing the 
asymmetric authority of CRAs relative to the EU in the constitution of the politics of limits.  
 
Systematic and Continuous 
Evidence of the ‘systematic’ and ‘continuous’ application of rating methodologies may be slightly 
more tangible. Consistency can be monitored; if the focus is on risk methods. Informal judgment, or 
government through uncertainty, eludes systematic capture. Thus, it is difficult to grasp exactly what 
of (political) significance in the construction of sovereign ratings will be studied and how. 
Irrespective of its acknowledged ‘special’ status by rating agencies, ESMA treats sovereign debt 
identically to corporate debt. No specific provisions for sovereigns are included in the regulation to 
make contingent liabilities much more explicit. ‘Key credit rating assumptions and criteria’ may be 
identified. But verifying whether they are ‘applied systematically’ to fluctuating fiscal politics or the 
‘objective reason’ for any divergence is highly problematic (ESMA, 2011b/462, Art.5 (1)).  
Here again there is a deliberate attempt to deploy ‘pre-defined methodologies’ to rating the 
fluid and contingent character of fiscal relations (CESR Guidance, 4B.42). Rather than tailoring 
context-specific approaches (i.e. differentiated ratings), this sanctions the transposition, and thus 
enhances the ubiquity, of risk vectors. Transitional matrices are a tool for computing the probability 
of rating migrations. Plagued by a procyclical bias and seldom problematized, yet readily applied 
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from one context to another, these techniques may be repeatable but sovereigns are unique. 
Management through uncertainty cannot be systematically orchestrated because it fails to reproduce 
itself at regular intervals. Again, risk dominates the regulatory approach.  
Continuity and consistency are fundamental to the sedimentation of ratings. Risk’s 
probabilistic (predictive) potential, arguably, promises some semblance of relative stability in an 
otherwise constantly changing world of finance. For investors, this provides a platform for their 
calculations. Asymmetric information and discrepancies in calculating capacities help foster a 
dependence on external ratings (Sinclair, 2005). If they are allowed to think that EU sanctioned 
methods, in fact, permit the synchronic comparison of credit ratings across different asset classes and 
time (ESMA, 2011b/462, Art.6 (1c)), investors may be less inclined to be diligent because continuity 
gives the impression of propriety. Time and repetition help normalize adherence to risk techniques. 
Subscription to these socio-technical devices subjects investors to (exogenous) constitutive forces. 
The effect is to inhibit regulation based on one’s own circumstances or through informal judgment. 
Here CRAs ‘design and impose modalities of encountering, and consequently sociotechnical 
algorithms of pricing, that produce asymmetries and guarantee the domination of certain agencies 
over others’ (Callon, 2007: 348). External ratings no longer compel (passive) managers to use as 
much of their own ‘self-conscious critical faculties’ in the assessment of creditworthiness (Holmes 
and Marcus, 2005: 237). Continuously skewed towards risk, and continuously blessed by the EU, 
their reiteration and citation impedes the endogenous responsibility of managing through one’s own 
uncertainty and diligently conducting one’s own research. Although reducing this overreliance on 
external forms of assessment is a priority for the EU (European Commission, 2010), the RTS may 
only heighten this dependence as they repeatedly work to entrench the validity and utility of risk 
techniques for investors. Constitutive effects are visible as investors relinquish a substantial degree 
of their judgment, liability and decision-making capacity to CRAs. As the surprisingly sustained 
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popularity of ratings shows, this helps normalize them into adherence. Here ESMA’s administrative 
apparatus legitimizes an infrastructure of referentiality which reinforces the authority of Moody’s or 
S&P as principal knowledge entrepreneurs in the politics of limits. Subsequently, as ratings remain 
one of the primary channels for communicating creditworthiness and translating it into market 
activity, their continuousness can also amplify the self-generative effects for CRAs. 
 
Validation Based on Historical Experience 
Ostensibly, the most arduous, if not the most perilous, responsibility for ESMA involves subjecting 
rating agencies to validation based on actual performance. Is there a comprehensive and integrated 
framework that can validate ‘reliable inputs, including appropriate size of data sample’ (ESMA, 
2011b/462, Art.7 (3c)), which ‘allows for a truly representative sample...to control the accuracy’ of 
ratings (CESR Guidance 4D.65-70, added italics)? For this purpose, ESMA concedes that the 
infrequency of sovereign defaults is highly problematic. Yet it offers no viable alternative apart from 
mimicking methods that attempt to transform (singular) fiscal uncertainties into (aggregate) pools of 
risk. Amounting to the misrepresentation of uncertainties as risk, the RTS can reaffirm the 
hegemony of the discourse of risk in assessing fiscal relations. At stake is the stability the EU and 
financial markets as significant information is distorted or withheld. 
Sovereigns rarely default. Prior to the Greek managed default, Ecuador (November 2008) 
was negligent on an interest payment of US$ 30.6 million owing on US$ 510 million of global bonds 
maturing in 2012, which it considered as ‘illegitimate’. Its second default in a decade, Ecuador 
eventually was downgraded to ‘Ca’ by Moody’s, who confirmed that ‘the government's decision to 
default was based on ideological and political grounds and not related to liquidity and solvency 
issues’ (Moody’s Investor Service, 2008b). Of course, no accurate measurements exist to forecast 
such factors. Distressed exchanges also occurred with Belize (2006) and Uruguay (2003). One of the 
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most notable was Argentina’s November 2001 announcement that it would fail to pay the coupon on 
its bonds. Eventually, US$ 82 billion of debt was restructured in 2005.   
  Now ESMA must devise some elaborate benchmark analysis capable of compensating for 
this limited population sample while simultaneously accounting for the extreme (political) 
heterogeneity present in available cases. Correlations between fluctuating political economies – 
especially as diverse as the emerging markets and EMU – are prone to failure. The diverse and 
factional socio-political elements, which factor into calculating the propensity towards fiscal failure, 
make arriving at an accurate comparison virtually impossible and improbable. Technical proxies, 
such as liquidity conditions, may be comparable for some purposes but when applied to sovereigns 
they distort fluid socio-political forces. Absolute default probabilities may not be what CRAs claim 
to measure but Moody’s (2002) admits that ‘there is an expectation that ratings will, on average, 
relate to subsequent default frequency’. Forward-looking evaluations are performed and 
supplemented with hypothetical stress tests. Probability distributions are integral to this comparison 
of peers (IMF, 2010). But lacking the appropriate sample size to conduct the assessments, these 
projections are at best incomplete, at worst fictitious.   
Back-testing divorces ratings from the messy world of fiscal politics; which is exactly the 
accusation leveled against CRAs by the EU. Virtual free reign in determining what constitutes as a 
relevant approximation can reinforce the self-generative effects for rating agencies as it elevates the 
status of their risk-based methods. As opposed to penetrating the hermetic enclosures of CRAs to 
enhance transparency and reveal ratings errors, this RTS approach is an implicit admission that risk-
based techniques alone are insufficient to assess the danger of sovereign default. Nevertheless, it still 
proposes risk calculus as a solution. A minimal burden of proof coupled with verification techniques 
that seem daunting to apply may serve to immunize rating agencies from serious scrutiny.  
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 In short, by relying on risk-based verification practices, EU policy neither prevents nor 
corrects the tremendous imbalances evident in the ratings space. Its incapability to ameliorate these 
inadequacies is not simply a procedural matter. More significantly, it stems from the regenerative 
performativity of ratings aligned with a ubiquitous and hegemonic discourse of risk. Performative 
effects on CRAs, investors and the EU can be exacerbated as the criteria used to evaluate sovereign 
ratings methodology helps render fiscal politics, and its susceptibility to governmental intervention, 
thinkable in terms of risk. Quantitative calculations impose an artificial uniformity on fiscal politics 
by judging democratic governments against an exogenous (neoliberal) model of appropriate 
budgetary conduct. As alternatives to risk calculus are invalidated so are competing visions of fiscal 
normality unaligned with Anglo-American forms of capitalism. But the legitimacy of this 
invalidation rests on the misrepresentation of uncertainty as risk in the constitution of 
creditworthiness. Arguably inadequate in redressing this approach, the RTS, in fact, may serve to 
embed its dominance. Yet such performativity cannot control the heterogeneous operational 
dimensions of budgetary governance for long. As national fiscal sovereignty is pushed to reassert 
itself, such as across the periphery of Europe, we could be witnessing the potential disruption of this 
programmatic ambition. 
 
Conclusion 
Debates about the definition of what normality ‘is’ often neglect what normality ‘does’. In other 
words, what are the performative effects of conceptualizing fiscal normality as a risk? Through a 
variety of significations, sovereign ratings help inscribe a meaning of what constitutes as appropriate 
budgetary conduct into the European political economy. Progressively acting to eliminate the alterity 
that exists between Member States – by inducing a fictitious bifurcation between the economy and 
politics through their performative effects – ratings are an internal form of governmentality aligned 
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with self-systemic, disinflationary logics of neoliberalism. For this purpose, the (depoliticizing) 
inertia of risk management is tremendous. A false dichotomy between (qualitative) uncertainty and 
(quantitative) risk is promoted to help constitute this austere politics of limits underpinning the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Insofar as these stabilizations are produced, their performation 
leaves them vulnerable to breakdown. Once crisis erupts and fiscal sovereignty is excessively 
threatened, as may happen across the periphery, the terms of the political within the economy are 
revisited as forms of social democracy are protected.      
 Through a diagnosis of this relationship between the programmatic and operational 
dimensions of fiscal governance, two observations are notable. First, by deconstructing how CRAs 
appropriate the constructs of risk and uncertainty in the design of sovereign bond ratings, we begin 
to appreciate how, in spite of the transformative illocutionary potential of ratings, the fictitious 
quantitative/qualitative binary opposition between risk and uncertainty contributes to their 
misrepresentation. This distortion permits contingent liabilities to be masked which, in turn, helps 
validate a prescriptive (artificial) fiscal normality. Together these instill a false degree of 
verisimilitude about the nature of fiscal relations and how amenable they are to intervention as they 
institutionalize a form of dysfunctional information exchange.  
Second, reconstruction shows how, based on this (dubious) knowledge, the performation of 
the politics of limits surrounding sovereign debt is fraught with perils and vulnerable to breakdown. 
Contestation abounds as the programmatic ambitions and effects of fiscal surveillance clash with 
national political agendas and aspirations. The inherent heterogeneity of European budgetary 
relations challenges excessive austerity and crippling adherence to neoliberal precepts. With the 
ensuing backlash that we are witnessing, the persistent failure of ratings to fundamentally transform 
national political economies can swell to disturb the performation of the politics of limits. In crisis, 
the parameters of the permissible become malleable; to what extent remains to be seen.   
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Sovereign ratings help engender self-generative effects for CRAs, constitutive effects for 
investors, and unintended consequences for Member States. Problematizing the EU regulatory 
response demonstrates how these effects can be exacerbated. Although this matrix may normalize a 
stabilization, it is fragile and susceptible to disruption. Misfires occur because ‘perlocution 
implies...the possibility of having an effect, but without any strong notion of probability or any 
possible version of necessity’ (Butler, 2010: 151). Government through uncertainty is equipped to 
deal with budgetary exigencies whereas risk only contributes to and exacerbates them by imposing 
an artificial uniformity on European fiscal landscapes. Of course, this is not claim that 
probabilistically quantifiable techniques are without merit. But to recognize the authoritative 
capacity of ratings is to understand how their construction facilitates their performativity. No matter 
how much authority ratings may command, ultimately, fiscal temperaments are fluid and too 
idiosyncratic to be captured in a probability distribution. 
 Therefore, the last thing that the EU needs to do is (inadvertently) sabotage its own ambitions 
and amplify the discourse of risk. Unfortunately, the four measures of the RTS are deficient in both 
their preventative and corrective capacities. Not only can rating quality suffer but mimicking 
methods that attempt to transform (singular) uncertainties into (aggregate) pools of risk can only 
make the EU complicit in their misrepresentation. Already in an asymmetric position relative to 
Moody’s or S&P, by adopting a predominantly risk-centered approach to the verification of 
sovereign ratings, the EU falls prey to conducting business on their terms. To varying degrees, this 
can help strengthen the self-generative effects for CRAs, heighten the dependence on external 
ratings for investors, and undermine the EU’s authority to manage effectively the sovereign debt 
crisis as it exposes Europe to the threat of further financial and fiscal failures. 
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Notes: 
1. Ratings are signals which inform market actors of the suitability standards of an issuer. Investment 
policies and mandates of portfolio and asset managers demand that they only invest in investment grade 
bonds. Ratings also certify which securities can serve as part of regulatory capital requirements.   
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